MEP Kirkhope fields questions and concerns from NGOs and airlines over the balance between freedom and security as debate intensifies over Passenger Name Records.

Timothy Kirkhope: PNR key tool for tackling major criminality

After the recent terrorist outrage in Paris,  security is back on the agenda.

EU leaders would like to  implement a common system

for exchanging information on airline  passengers travelling to or through the EU.

Passenger Name Records, or PNR,  could provide names, addresses,

banking data, itineraries and other details.  But the idea is controversial

and was rejected  by the Civil Liberties Committee in 2013.

We spoke to Timothy Kirkhope, the MEP  responsible for the EP's report on PNR.

Timothy Kirkhope, you're the rapporteur  on the Passenger Name Record project,

which of course was originally rejected by  the Civil Liberties Committee back in 2013.

We've had judgements  from the EU Court of Justice.

It is coming back now  due to changed circumstances,

and we have now got a series of questions  from civil society, if you like,

to which I would like you  to give us an answer.

The first is from the European Association  for the Defence of Human Rights.

Will PNR system uphold the basic right  to personal data protection -

the balance between freedom and security.

More precisely, what regulatory  and procedural safeguards will there be

to protect the data recorded, with regard to  the content, recipients and retention period.

'The PNR has come back  because of circumstances'.

Actually it hasn't, it's been around  for three years as a very worthwhile project

to try and put some  European standards in place

for the information  which is taken from passengers,

the information we obtained  when they travel by air.

This is obviously very important when  we are dealing not only with recent events

like the terrible terrorism attacks in Paris,

but also of course  with major criminality:

people who are involved  in trafficking in people or children.

In other words, it is information  which is available to the authorities

in certain circumstances  with strict controls on its use

And this is actually very important  for law enforcement right across Europe.

It would not have stopped, for instance,  the 7/7 attack in London

or the attack on Charlie Hebdo  as these were nationals,

these people were home-grown terrorists,  they hadn't flown there

so in a way it doesn't provide all  the protection needed.

it may or may not have been useful  in any particular case.

I don't claim that it is the only measure  that we need to protect us.

The information that is taken from people  when they travel by air

is information which actually provides the  authorities with certain patterns of activity,

which is what it is about.  This is not a profiling exercise,

it is an exercise in looking at patterns.

Patterns give them the intelligence  or the information they need

to look at something more closely, to see  the activities of an individual more closely.

OK, we'll move on to the second question.  This time from an airline, Lufthansa,

who also have a question for you  if I can just call it up.

European airlines are caught  between a rock and a hard place.

Third country governments require us  to transfer PNR data.

If we fail to do so, we will be sanctioned.

On the other hand if we transfer the data,  we will violate the national law of EU States.

What is your advice to European airlines?

At the moment, we have one or two PNR  arrangements in place in EU countries,

such as in Britain, such as the Belgians,  the French and so on.

But they are now going to have them  and they want to have them themselves.

The problem I am seeing is the possibility  of having 28 different PNR systems

in different countries  rather than one set of standards,

one PNR system,  but operated by the nation states.

Third question, coming from another NGO,  this time it's European Digital Rights.

What I would like to know is, what are the  new and additional pieces of information

that would be collected under this system,  that you see as worth the bureaucracy,

the cost and the intrusion  that this system will introduce?

Obviously, the bits of information  that would be required for the PNR

would be rather longer than the API, basic  information that the airlines have now.

I always make the point,  when people say:

'You are going to get all this information  from us, the surveillance etc is intrusive.',

I then respond saying: look when I open  my supermarket Clubcard account,

I am required to give more information  without any safeguards on how it is used

than we are going to be requiring for PNR  to help the security of the citizens.

We want a limit on how long something  can be stored, we have a 5-year proposal.

Also, of course, the information can only  be accessed by people of sufficient seniority

where we have made it very clear  what their status is, and so on.

I mean clearly there are others  within the EU Parliament

who don't, presently, sadly, share my  enthusiasm or determination to have this.

They have to answer the security question

and they have to answer the whole point  about what the alternative might mean.

Timothy Kirkhope, thank you very much,  -Thank you.